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Juror Punishment, Juror Guidance and the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
Kevin Crosby
*
 
The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 creates several new offences relating to juror 
misconduct, which have generally been considered pragmatic responses to the immediate 
problem of jurors using the internet to find additional “evidence”. Taking as its starting 
point the possibility of jury studies being written from an “interdisciplinary” perspective 
situated between mainstream legal scholarship and legal history, this article argues that after 
the practical abolition of juror punishment in 1670 the judge-jury relationship has usually 
been focused on juror guidance, not on juror punishment. This has had important 
consequences for the institution’s civic function, meaning any move in the direction of juror 
punishment has to be considered not simply as a pragmatic response to an immediate, 
isolated problem, but also as an important part of the jury’s continuing history as a political 
institution.
                                                 
*
 Lecturer in Law, Newcastle University. An earlier version of this article was presented at the UKIVR 
conference at Queen Mary, University of London in April 2013. I am grateful for the comments I received at 
this conference, particularly those of Phil Handler and Arlie Loughnan. I also explored several of the issues 
discussed here in my PhD thesis, and I am therefore grateful to Steven Cammiss, Sally Kyd Cunningham and 
Cheryl Thomas for their support and guidance. I would also like to thank the Criminal Law Review’s two 
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Following growing unease about jurors researching their cases (and occasionally contacting 
defendants) online, the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 has created several indictable 
offences of juror misconduct. These offences focus, in particular, on evidence found by jurors 
independently, and not presented at trial.
1
 The Act makes it an offence for jurors to ‘research 
the case during the trial period’,2 to ‘disclose [improper] information to another member of 
the jury during the trial period’,3 and to engage in ‘conduct from which it may reasonably be 
concluded that the [juror] intends to try the issue otherwise than on the basis of the evidence 
presented in the proceedings on the issue’.4 Those found guilty of one of the new offences 
will be liable to imprisonment for up to two years, and will be disqualified from further 
service for a decade.
5
 What distinguishes these new offences from the existing option of 
using contempt proceedings is the fact jurors would now be proceeded against on indictment: 
that they would be tried by their peers for alleged misconduct. This represents a significant 
change in juror management techniques, as it is probable that criminal trial jurors accused of 
misconduct have never been tried in this way. 
The new offences have been drafted in the context of jurors using the internet in a way which 
undermines their oath to ‘give a true verdict according to the evidence’.6 While legal 
historians have been unable to paint a complete picture of the ‘self-informing’ jury’s decline,7 
it is clear that for the past few centuries criminal trial jurors have been expected to come to 
                                                 
1
 This has not only been a problem in England and Wales. See, for example, the recent New Zealand case in 
which evidence marked with official stamps but not formally introduced as evidence was found in the jury 
room: Guy v R [2014] NZSC 165; and more generally Law Commission, Contempt of Court: a consultation 
paper (HMSO 2012), Law Com. Consultation Paper No.209, paras 4.36-4.37. 
2
 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.71(3), creating a new s.20A of the Juries Act 1974. 
3
 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.72, creating a new s.20B of the Juries Act 1974. 
4
 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.73, creating a new s.20C of the Juries Act 1974. The Act also creates 
the indictable offence of disclosing a jury’s deliberations: Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2014 s.74, creating 
new ss.20D-G of the Juries Act 1974 and repealing Contempt of Court Act 1981, s.8 in England and Wales. 
5
 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.77(1), creating a new s.6A of the Juries Act 1974. 
6
 Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Senior Courts) [2013] EWCA Crim 1631; [2013] 1 WLR 3164, 
paras 39M.2, 39E.3. 
7
 See generally J Oldham, The Varied Life of the Self-Informing Jury (London: Selden Society, 2005). 
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court as a kind of juridical tabula rasa, without detailed knowledge either of the facts or of 
the law involved in a particular case.
8
 The growing normality of internet communications 
being used as a primary source of information has undermined this presumption;
9
 and when 
he was the Chief Justice Lord Judge made a point of emphasising the need to maintain the 
jury’s neutrality and therefore its central role as independent arbiter of the competing 
accounts given by the prosecution and defence.
10
 Given the importance of maintaining the 
jury’s role as the independent lynchpin in the modern adversarial trial system, various 
strategies have been tried in order to dissuade jurors from looking for additional evidence. In 
this way, the eighteenth-century’s passive jury11 is being defended against a potential return 
towards the more ancient jury of community suspicion.
12
 
Initial judicial responses to the problem of juror research focused on directing the jury in a 
way which could either prevent illicit research in the first place or, at the very least, ensure it 
did not affect any particular verdict.
13
 In more recent years, there have been several jurors 
convicted of contempt following evidence of online misconduct;
14
 and in the 2012 
consultation paper which ultimately led to the drafting of the new Act, the Law Commission 
                                                 
8
 The presumed legal ignorance of jurors has been partially reduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which 
lifted the prohibition on judges, lawyers and police officers serving on juries; and as recently as 2010 the Court 
of Appeal had to consider whether jury research into the law affecting their trial automatically rendered a jury’s 
verdict unsafe (the Court of Appeal held that it did not): R v Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 1623; [2011] 1 
WLR 200, 207-208. 
9
 See Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): juror misconduct and internet publications (HMSO 2013), Law 
Com. No.340, HC Paper No.860, paras 3.26-3.33; and D Eady and ATH Smith, Arlidge, Eady and Smith on 
Contempt: first supplement to the fourth edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), paras 1-190A-1-190C. 
10
 Discussed in K Crosby, ‘Controlling Devlin’s Jury: what the jury thinks, and what the jury sees onine’ [2012] 
Crim LR 15, 21. Lord Judge’s understanding of adversarialism seems to have been very similar to that defended 
on several occasions by Neil MacCormick: N MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: OUP, 
1978), pp.86-97; DN MacCormick, ‘The Coherence of a Case and the Reasonableness of Doubt’ (1980) 2 
Liverpool LR 45. 
11
 JH Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: OUP, 2003), pp.318-320. 
12
 ‘The Assize of Clarendon (1166)’ in DC Douglas and GW Greenaway (eds), English Historical Documents, 
vol 2, 2
nd
 edn (Oxford: OUP, 1981), p.441. 
13
 Cheryl Thomas has been working with the judiciary in order to find effective ways of making this happen: C 
Thomas, ‘Avoiding the Perfect Storm of Juror Contempt’ [2013] Crim LR 483. Ashworth, meanwhile, has 
argued that jurors should be required to sign a document committing them to the standards expected of jurors: A 
Ashworth, ‘Editorial: Contempt of court: juror misconduct and internet publications’ [2014] Crim LR 169. 
14
 See Law Commission (n.9), paras 3.2-3.6. 
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noted the need to have a punitive response in place ‘where preventative measures fail’.15 
Despite the Contempt of Court Act 1981,
16
 contempt proceedings are ultimately governed by 
common law;
17
 and the House of Lords has held that contempt should not be tried on 
indictment.
18
 The Law Commission, however, was concerned that traditional contempt 
proceedings denied jurors some of the procedural guarantees associated with a Crown Court 
trial.
19
 It also felt that 
‘a discrete offence could send an important message to jurors about the seriousness 
with which such conduct is regarded. It could also … provid[e] greater clarity about 
what is and is not permitted’.20 
For these reasons, in 2013 the Law Commission recommended the creation of the new 
indictable offences.
21
 
In this article, I shall argue that understanding – and critiquing – this move towards 
punishment needs more than an awareness of present trends in the criminal trial. As the Act 
went through Parliament, most comments on the juror punishment provisions were broadly 
supportive, and tended only to query specific, detailed points,
22
 not points of broader 
principle. Despite the advances made by legal historians over the past few decades with 
                                                 
15
 Law Commission (n.1), para 4.33. 
16
 Contempt of Court Act 1981. 
17
 See D Eady and ATH Smith, Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt 4
th
 edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2011), paras 1-119-1-1-123; and Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1985] AC 339 
(HL). 
18
 R v D [1984] AC 778 (HL). 
19
 Law Commission (n.1) para 4.67. Although see Eady and Smith (n 17), paras 2-24: ‘Such safeguards have 
been built into the rules that it is difficult to identify any injustice to alleged contemnors, and in effect the only 
advantage that they do not have which is associated with criminal proceedings generally is that of jury trial.’ 
20
 Law Commission (n.1), para 4.38. 
21
 Law Commission (n.9), paras 3.57-3.100. In fact, the Law Commission only recommended one offence, but 
Law Commissioner Professor David Ormerod QC, giving evidence to the Commons, has confirmed that all the 
offences broadly conform with the underlying philosophy of the Law Commission’s recommendations: 
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill Deb 11 Mar 2014, col 68. 
22
 See, e.g., Criminal Justice and Court Bill Deb 25 Mar 2014, cols 402-406. 
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regard to our understanding of the criminal justice system,
23
 in England at least this literature 
is rarely taken seriously in mainstream studies of the jury. If it is used at all in such studies, 
history is generally treated as interesting background information or, at most, as a way of 
giving context to a particular feature of the system. History is, in this context, generally 
understood as a way of answering questions, but is rarely used as a way of asking them. In 
this article I shall attempt to correct this imbalance, suggesting that legal history can be a 
useful way of opening up, or furthering thought about the institution. My suggestion, in short, 
is that students of the English jury would do well to learn to think through history. 
The idea that history can be a useful way of widening legal horizons is far from new. In 1986, 
for example, the social historian EP Thompson criticised the Roskill Committee for 
recommending the abolition of the defence’s right to peremptory challenges without 
consulting any historians (excepting Lord Devlin, who Thompson was happy to regard as a 
legal historian but who the Committee failed to reference). Not taking history into account, 
Thompson argued, left the Committee blind to ‘the long-established rights, practices and 
traditions of the English and Welsh peoples’.24 But it should be noted that even if the 
Committee had included a historian they may have recommended the abolition of peremptory 
challenges anyway. Including a historical element in legal thought does not require the 
adoption of something like Hay’s assertion that property and authority are closely combined 
in the criminal law (or indeed Beattie’s argument that levels of prosecution are best explained 
by reference to social factors such as food prices, war and perceptions of gender).
25
 It does, 
                                                 
23
 See generally ‘Punishment and Guidance in the History of the Criminal Trial Jury’, below. 
24
 Lord Roskill (Chair), Fraud Trials Committee Report (London: HMSO, 1986). EP Thompson, 'Subduing the 
Jury [Part 1]' (1986) 8(21) London Review of Books 7. Thompson argued that Devlin might be considered a 
legal historian. His critique continued in EP Thompson, 'Subduing the Jury [Part 2]' (1986) 8(22) London 
Review of Books 12. 
25
 D Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’ in D Hay, P Linebaugh, JG Rule, EP Thompson and C 
Winslow (eds), Albion’s Fatal Tree: crime and society in eighteenth-century England (London: Allen Lane, 
1975); JM Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Oxford: OUP, 1986), pp.199-264. 
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however, mean opening up legal thought to the wider range of issues explored in these and 
other works of legal history. 
The biggest danger when encouraging lawyers to engage with history is that they will fail to 
appreciate historical difference. Holmes once argued the training of lawyers was 
insufficiently concerned with context,
26
 and at the same time Maitland contended that a 
lawyer’s training made her inattentive to history as anything other than a source of 
authority.
27
 Turning to history can, however, be a useful way for lawyers to expand their 
arguments beyond those which their training encourages them to deem relevant. John 
Langbein, for example, has encouraged lawyers to appreciate what he considers the inherent 
disadvantages of adversarial trials, and he has primarily made this argument through 
historical analyses of eighteenth-century trial records.
28
 What all this means is that lawyers 
should continue to use history, but that the use they put it to should not be the kind of use 
which simply provides clear-cut, authoritative answers. Rather, legal scholars should learn to 
use history as a way of opening up conceptual problems to fresh analysis, as Whitman has 
done for the standard of proof in criminal trials and as Mulcahy has done for the architecture 
of courtrooms and courthouses.
29
 This kind of ‘use’ also poses wider questions, such as the 
law’s role in wider political or cultural processes. Legal history, then, has the potential to 
become an important, imaginative part of legal thought. 
Punishment and guidance in the history of the criminal trial jury 
                                                 
26
 OW Holmes Jr, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harv LR 61, 465-466. 
27
 FW Maitland, ‘Why the History of English Law is not Written’, in HAL Fisher, The Collected Papers of 
Frederic William Maitland, vol 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 1911). 
28
 See, e.g., JH Langbein, 'The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers' (1978) 45 U Chi L Rev 263; JH Langbein, 
‘Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: a view from the Ryder sources’ (1983) 50 U Chi L Rev 1; 
Langbein (n.11); and JH Langbein, 'Bifurcation and the Bench: The Influence of the Jury on English 
Conceptions of the Judiciary' in P Brand and J Getzler (eds), Judges and Judging in the History of the Common 
Law and Civil Law: From Antiquity to Modern Times (Cambridge: CUP, 2012). 
29
 JQ Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: theological roots of the criminal trial (New Haven: Yale UP, 
2008); L Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: due process and the place of law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
7 
 
In this section, I shall pull together several threads in the jury’s history which might throw 
new light on the offences created by the Courts Act. The jury’s recent history (in the period 
since the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was passed)
30
 has been characterised by two somewhat 
related problems. First, there has been the question of “trust” in the jury: after the House of 
Lords vetoed attempts to create juryless trials in complex cases,
31
 attention turned to the 
question of trusting the jury to understand the evidence in such situations.
32
 A major 
development here has been the growth of written directions and particularly routes to 
verdict.
33
 The adoption of such directions was advocated in the 2010 Crown Court Bench 
Book and,
34
 while Penny Derbyshire reported the following year that their use appeared to be 
exceptional,
35
 Thomas has since found that seventy per cent of juries, in a study of twenty 
trials held in Greater London between 2012 and 2013, received written directions of some 
kind.
36
 Second, there has been the problem of jurors accessing illicit information online, 
effectively becoming, in the legal-historical jargon, “self-informing”.37 The official response 
here has involved a tension between guiding jurors away from improper conduct and 
punishing those who act improperly anyway.
38
 While the two problems have overlapped, at 
least inasmuch as both involve the question of how best to guide a jury towards a proper 
                                                 
30
 The Criminal Justice Act 2003, among many other things, made juryless trial in the Crown Court possible 
where jury tampering had taken place and it would be too difficult (for, e.g., cost reasons) to empanel another 
jury; and it also carried out significant reforms in the laws of evidence, greatly increasing the likelihood of a 
jury receiving evidence of, for example, a defendant’s previous bad character. For a discussion of the 2003 Act 
in its own historical context, see P Thornton, ‘Trial by Jury: 50 years of change’ [2004] Crim LR 119. 
31
 HL Deb 20 Mar 2007, vol 690, cols 1146-1204; debating Fraud (Trials without a Jury) HL Bill (2006-07) 31. 
32
 Lord Judge, ‘Trusting the Jury’ (2007) <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/speech-lcj-23102007/> accessed 
November 2014. The full text of the speech is no longer available online, but the abstract (which is still 
available) gives a good sense of what Lord Judge said. 
33
 See, e.g., N Madge, ‘Summing Up – a judge’s perspective’ [2006] Crim LR 817; P Darbyshire, Sitting in 
Judgment: the working lives of judges (Oxford: Hart, 2011), pp.215-217; Crosby (n.10); and Thomas (n.13). 
34
 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: directing the jury (March 2010), p.3. 
35
 Darbyshire (n.34), p.216. 
36
 Thomas (n.13), 497-498. 
37
 Oldham (n.7). 
38
 See generally ‘Guidance and Punishment in Early-Twenty-First-Century Jury Trial’, below. 
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conclusion,
39
 the new offences sit firmly within the second problem. For this reason, I shall 
focus here on punishment and guidance in the history of the criminal trial jury. 
The first major form of juror punishment was the “attaint”, although it only appears to have 
applied to civil jurors.
40
 If a verdict’s accuracy was doubted, twenty-four jurors could be 
assembled to rehear the evidence (as well as evidence the jurors claimed to have relied on but 
which was not presented at the original trial)
41
 and determine whether the impugned verdict 
was accurate. Blackstone stated that the common law attaint stripped jurors of their ‘liberam 
legem’, their goods, their chattels, and their lands; that their houses would be razed, their 
trees rooted up, and their meadows ploughed; and that they would also be imprisoned.
42
 Two 
sixteenth-century statutes reduced the punishment to mere ‘perpetual infamy’ and a fine,43 
but even this lesser punishment retained strong overtones of civil death.
44
 This system fell 
into disuse in the early modern period
45
 and was abolished in the nineteenth century, with the 
proviso that those seeking to influence a jury’s decision, as well as corrupt jurors, could still 
be fined and imprisoned.
46
 Such prosecutions were to proceed by indictment or information 
(i.e. proceedings instituted by the Crown without the use of a grand jury);
47
 although it is 
unclear how frequently these embracery provisions were used.
48
 
                                                 
39
 Or, as Thomas has put it, how to ‘achieve behavioural change’: Criminal Justice and Courts Bill Deb 13 Mar 
2014, col 128. 
40
 JM Zane, ‘The Attaint’ (1916) 15 Mich L Rev 1-20 [part 1], 127-148 [part 2]; and HJ Berman and CJ Reid Jr, 
‘The Transformation of English Legal Science from Hale to Blackstone’ (1996) 45 Emory LJ 437, 468. 
41
 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 3 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1768) (available on 
Eighteenth-Century Collections Online [hereafter ‘ECCO’]), p.403. 
42
 Ibid. On the earlier connection between felonies and exclusion from feudal rights, see JGA Pocock, The 
Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1957), p.107-108. 
43
 Blackstone (n.42), pp.403-404. 
44
 On the concept of “civil death”, see HD Saunders, ‘Civil Death – a new look at an ancient doctrine’ (1970) 11 
Wm & Mary L Rev 1969. 
45
 Zane (n.41), 141-147. 
46
 Juries Act 1825 ss.60-61. In other words, the abolition of the attaint was coupled with a clear statement that 
embracery was not also abolished. 
47
 Blackstone (n.42), pp.303-308. 
48
 I am currently carrying out archival research on this and related questions. 
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It is unlikely that the attaint ever applied to criminal juries. In its 1670 decision in Bushell’s 
Case, the Court of Common Pleas was asked to assess the legality of judges fining and 
imprisoning jurors for delivering a “false” verdict.49 Chief Justice Vaughan, delivering the 
judgment of the court, held that this was not permissible without clear evidence of 
misconduct. Vaughan, a judge sitting in a primarily civil court, emphasised the importance of 
the attaint in guaranteeing the independence of the jury: the attaint system ensured that 
questions of fact remained in the hands of jurors, not of judges.
50
 One of the major reasons 
for Vaughan’s rejection of judges fining jurors for delivering false verdicts was that the 
practice undermined this structural separation. He probably would have preferred a system of 
criminal attaint, but could find virtually no precedent for such a system.
51
 Modern legal 
historians have also failed to find evidence of attaint for criminal juries,
52
 and have suggested 
that several key features of the criminal trial and appeal system in England and Wales can be 
attributed to the need to find other ways of guaranteeing the accuracy of a jury’s verdict.53 
This does not mean that criminal trial juries had never been punished, however: the decision 
in Bushell’s Case took place against a backdrop of an increasingly penal judicial approach 
towards jury management. During the mass prosecution of Quakers in the 1660s,
54
 some 
judges had sternly instructed their jurors to take the law from the Bench. In one of the Quaker 
                                                 
49
 Bushell’s Case (1670) 124 ER 1006; (1670) Vaughan 135. 
50
 Ibid, 143-145. 
51
 Ibid, 146, 151-154. 
52
 TA Green, Verdict According to Conscience: perspectives on the English criminal trial jury, 1200-1800 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp.19, 339; Whitman (n.30), pp.154-155. 
53
 See in particular Whitman (n.30). Langbein has urged caution, however, describing an earlier attempt at 
presenting the law of evidence as a product of the jury as ‘awkward, because the jury system originated in the 
twelfth century, whereas the law of evidence is much more recent’: JH Langbein, ‘Historical Foundations of the 
Law of Evidence: a view from the Ryder sources’ (1996) 96 Colum L Rev 1168, 1169-1170. For a full 
elaboration of Langbein’s argument regarding the relationship between the law of evidence and the development 
of the adversarial trial, see Langbein (n.11). 
54
 See generally WC Braithwaite, The Second Period of Qaukerism, HJ Cadbury (ed), 2
nd
 edn (Cambridge: CUP, 
1961), pp.21-54. Although Braithwaite notes that few Quakers were actually deported: ibid, pp.44-51. 
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pamphlets of 1664 detailing their trials, it was reported that a juror, having overheard a 
witness confessing perjury, asked the trial judge 
‘Is this good Evidence? [The judge] was angry and threatened him for undervaluing 
the Evidence, and said, he should know that the Court had power to punish him, and 
would do it.’55 
Three years later, in 1667, the judge most notorious for punishing juries (Kelyng, the then 
Chief Justice) was brought before the Commons to explain himself. Having heard his 
evidence, the Commons decided not to proceed further against Kelyng; but they did resolve 
that ‘the precedents and practice of fining or imprisoning jurors is illegal’,56 and planned to 
bring in a Bill to that effect. The 1670 decision in Bushell’s Case simply formed one part of 
this wider debate about the punishment and guidance of criminal trial juries.
57
 
So after 1670 judges were only able to imprison criminal jurors if they had proof of 
misconduct, and they were therefore compelled to focus on jury guidance. A focus on 
guidance was not entirely new, however: there is evidence that Kelyng punished jurors only 
as a last resort, where they had refused to follow his advice.
58
 After Bushell’s Case, as 
Langbein has emphasised, questions of guidance simply became more important. ‘As the 
judges lost their ability to detect and correct what they perceived to be jury error, they 
developed a new system of jury control, whose emphasis was on preventing jury error’;59 
although Langbein also argues that the eighteenth-century ‘lawyerization’ of the criminal 
                                                 
55
 Anon, The Cry of the Innocent and Oppressed for Justice (1664), p.19 (EEBO [Early English Books Online] 
image 204888:10). 
56
 ‘Resolutions of the Commons on the Punishment of Juries, 13 December 1667’ in A Browning (ed), English 
Historical Documents, vol 8 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), p.86. 
57
 See generally K Crosby, ‘Bushell’s Case and the Juror’s Soul’ (2012) 33 JLH 251; and Green (n.53), pp.200-
264. 
58
 See in particular Hood’s Case 84 ER 1077, Kel J 50, where Kelyng fined members of a jury only after 
repeatedly trying to persuade them to adopt his legal directions as controlling. 
59
 Langbein (n.11), p.330. For an excellent example of an eighteenth-century debate on the interplay between 
jury verdicts, jury obedience and judicial directions, see R v Shipley (1784) 99 ER 774. 
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trial, with the accompanying prioritisation of judicial passivitiy, made it more difficult for 
this control to be exercised.
60
 In the adversarial system, evidence and judicial directions 
became crucial techniques for managing juries; and as Whitman has shown, even the 
“reasonable doubt” standard of proof in criminal trials originated in the need to persuade 
jurors that convictions were spiritually acceptable.
61
 In post-revolutionary America, the 
question whether a juror must obey judicial directions remained a pressing problem until at 
least 1895.
62
 Without widespread punishment, jury management became increasingly 
important. 
While judges may have been forced to rethink their approach to the jury after 1670, they still 
had to operate within the context of the jury’s perceived advantages as a popular, republican 
institution.
63
 The idea of the jury as a means of civic engagement had two major aspects. 
First, that jurors are required to make decisions for themselves, rather than simply following 
judicial instructions. This claim formed an important part of the context of the debates about 
the “verdict according to conscience” at least between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Following the decision in Bushell’s Case, English pamphleteers vigorously debated 
the precise meaning of the judgment, with several arguing that it was a necessary 
precondition of jury trial that jurors approach their task with a robust sense of their own 
independence, and that a servile jury was by definition no jury at all.
64
 These arguments, 
                                                 
60
 Langbein (n.11), p.331. Although Howlin has recently argued that this cannot be a complete explanation for 
English juror passivity, as Irish jurors remained active long after “lawyerization”: N Howlin, ‘Passive Observers 
or Active Participants? Jurors in civil and criminal trials’ (2014) 35 JLH 143. 
61
 Whitman (n.30). 
62
 Sparf and Hansen v United States (1895) 156 US 51. On the political reception of Bushell’s Case, including 
detailed comments on its reception in America, see S Stern, ‘Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: 
debating rationales for jury nullification after Bushell’s Case’ (2002) 111 Yale LJ 1815. 
63
 See Green (n.53), pp.349-355. 
64
 Crosby (n.58), 280-288. On the connection between jury discretion and post-Reformation theology, see HJ 
Berman, Law and Revolution II: the impact of the Protestant reformations on the Western legal tradition 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 2003), p.321. See also A Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: a critical 
introduction to criminal law, 3
rd
 edn (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p.53-57. 
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which relied on a particular vision of the robust republican citizen,
65
 persisted throughout the 
eighteenth century and appear to have survived the voyage to America.
66
 
This first image of the jury as a political institution was only possible on condition that the 
people who constituted the jury went into court with a fully-elaborated sense of what the 
criminal justice system should and should not do. This, however, has not always been an easy 
requirement either to satisfy or to justify. Discussing the law of seditious libel in 1771, Burke 
argued that the varied characters of the people called to serve on juries was incompatible with 
the certainty required of a legal system, if jurors are permitted to engage in jury “equity”.67 
He also doubted whether the empanelling of a sufficiently independent jury could, as a matter 
of fact, be relied upon in any particular case, noting 
‘[a] timid jury will give way to an awful judge delivering oracularly the law, and 
charging them on their oaths, and putting it home to their consciences, to beware of 
judging, where the law had given them no competence’.68 
This first vision of the jury as a means of civic engagement, then, must be called into 
question to the extent that a quasi-random sample of the population are not sufficiently 
independent, and do not place great emphasis on principles of self-governance. 
                                                 
65
 Republican in Skinner’s and Pettit’s sense of not being subject to the will of another: see generally P Pettit, 
Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government (Oxford: OUP, 1997); and Q Skinner, Liberty before 
Liberalism (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), particularly at p.84, where Skinner draws a clear distinction between ‘neo-
roman’ (i.e. republican) and liberal conceptions of liberty. 
66
 See in particular Stern (n.73), 1851-1857. The common law did not simply land with the settlers, however, but 
was gradually adopted (and adapted) in order to suit local needs. See WE Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial 
America, vol 1 (Oxford: OUP, 2008); and WE Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America, vol2 (Oxford: 
OUP, 2013). 
67
 E Burke, ‘Speech: on a motion, made by the Right Hon Wm Dowdeswell, for leave to bring in a Bill for 
explaining the power of juries in prosecutions for libels’ in The Works of the Right Hon Edmund Burke, vol 2 
(Holdsworth and Ball 1834), pp.492-493. 
68
 Ibid, p.493. 
13 
 
The second way in which the jury was considered to be a crucial civic institution was through 
the claim that jury trial educated members of the community, ensuring they understood how 
their society was governed and ultimately creating a better-educated citizenry. This jury was 
political not in its character as the setting where ‘the people come into the court’69 in order to 
‘consult their reason and their consciences, their precedents and their sense of who we are 
and who we have been’.70 Rather, it was a republican schoolhouse. The most famous 
proponent of this second view was Tocqueville, who suggested that the jury should be 
understood not only as a legal but also as a political institution. Having conceded that the jury 
might not be the best means of settling complex questions of fact,
71
 Tocqueville nonetheless 
insisted that overlooking its political value would be a grave error. The jury, he argued, 
‘must be looked upon as a free and ever-open classroom in which each juror learns his 
rights … and is taught the law in a manner both practical and within his intellectual 
grasp by the efforts of advocates, the opinions of judges and the very passions of the 
litigants.’72 
Implicit in this quotation from Tocqueville is the claim that the jury’s role as republican 
schoolhouse is structurally connected to certain methods of what Frank called ‘courthouse 
government’:73 that it flows out of and is not opposed to the practice which later generations 
would know as “adversarialism”. Tocqueville’s argument was not simply that the experience 
of deliberating would imbue jurors with a habit of mind necessary for the persistence of a 
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functioning participatory democracy.
74
 In addition, his jurors were expected to benefit from 
the advice of counsel and of the trial judge, and from the energies of the parties in their 
competition with one another. While this combination of factors does not necessarily imply 
the whole ideological structure Damaška set out in his definitive writings on the subject,75 
what Tocqueville is describing here is adversarialism, and the associated claim that the 
judicial task is properly limited to presiding over a dispute and ensuring the jury understands 
its task. So in this concept of the jury as a republican schoolhouse, there are several 
conditions which no doubt accidentally made this vision of the jury’s purpose possible. 
Central among these was a judicial sense that juries must be managed rather than punished. 
After 1670, it was difficult for judges to justify punishing jurors; and while it remained 
possible in limited circumstances for jurors to be proceeded against for contempt or 
embracery, it is unclear how frequently these powers were used. This does not mean that 
judges abandoned all hope of guaranteeing good behaviour from their juries, however: they 
simply had to develop more sophisticated techniques, recognising the central role of 
directions in guiding jurors towards legally-acceptable conclusions. This shift away from 
punishment and towards guidance made possible the idea that jury trial was not simply about 
community representatives bringing their local expertise (factual, moral and political) into the 
courtroom. It was seen that jury service could also be about education, in the direct sense that 
it was the judge’s responsibility to ensure each jury understood the law well enough to be 
able to reach an accurate verdict, but also in the indirect sense that jury service meant civic 
engagement, which in turn ensured a community’s citizens would become more virtuous.76 
And this whole movement was made possible because of a shift in perceptions about the 
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proper relationship between judges and juries: that the relationship is fundamentally about 
guidance, not about censure. 
Guidance and punishment in early twentieth-century jury trial 
In this final substantive section, I shall explore the relationship between guidance and 
punishment in the recent history of English juries. Faced with the recurring problem of jurors 
using the internet to find improper “evidence”, judges initially developed techniques of jury 
guidance designed to guarantee the accuracy and legality of each jury’s verdict.77 This is 
problematic from the perspective of a theory of the jury which focuses on “jury equity”, of 
the jury’s potential to escape judicial control. But the development of judicial techniques of 
jury management can from another angle be viewed as a continuation of the history sketched 
out above: of the idea that the judge’s two key tasks are to police the evidence the jury sees, 
and to educate the jury about the correct legal response to this evidence.
78
 As was discussed 
above, this image of the judge-jury relationship can be situated within a model of the jury’s 
political function which focuses on jury service as a civic schoolhouse. This second model of 
the jury’s political function is, however, undermined by a return to jury punishment. That this 
critique has not been made is, I contend, symptomatic of a general failure to take the jury’s 
history seriously. 
In the decade since the last major statutory changes to jury trial,
79
 online misconduct has 
made questions of punishment and control central to jury debates once again. A recently as 
2005, in an episode of ‘Peep Show’ which explored issues of jury misconduct, there was no 
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indication that the internet might encourage misbehaviour (although there were scenes in 
which the juror and defendant communicated using text messages).
80
 But despite the lack of 
lay awareness regarding the potential for online misconduct, the first major example of such 
behaviour had actually come two years earlier. In 2003, a rape conviction had been partially 
informed by online jury research, the jurors having gone online and found an article 
advocating a feminist perspective on rape.
81
 The conviction was quashed on appeal in 2005 
(the same year that the ‘Peep Show’ episode was first aired), but no further action was taken 
against the jurors. This is not the only high profile example of jurors turning to the internet in 
order either to supplement the evidence presented to them at court or to contact a defendant.
82
 
Several cases of this sort have received large amounts of media coverage, leading to 
widespread calls for an effective solution.  
The primary judicial response to this problem has been to attempt to steer jurors away from 
misconduct. Jurors are now routinely directed at the start of a trial not to use the internet to 
carry out independent research, and not to use Facebook or Twitter to discuss their case.
83
 
This points to a judicial preference for educating jurors about their role, rather than punishing 
them for breaches;
84
 and a 2004 practice direction explicitly stated that the threat of contempt 
proceedings should only be resorted to as a last option.
85
 Nonetheless, the problem of juror 
misconduct has continued, and the correct procedure for dealing with suspected misconduct 
has been re-examined judicially on a number of occasions. The current edition of the relevant 
practice direction instructs trial judges confronted with suspected misconduct to speak to the 
affected jurors in order to ascertain whether they can be trusted to ‘continue and remain 
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faithful to their oath or affirmation’,86 discharging either an individual juror or the whole jury 
if the answer to this question is “no”.87 Judges, faced with growing evidence of jury 
misconduct, have tried to improve existing managerial techniques rather than jumping 
straight to the much more dramatic solution of contempt. 
Given the history of jury trial since 1670, it is not surprising to see the judiciary responding to 
this kind of problem by re-examining the question of judicial directions: the idea of judges 
guiding their juries has been central to jury trial for centuries. This does not mean that the 
project has been without its difficulties, however. In Thompson, Lord Judge stressed the need 
for jurors to report suspected misconduct as early as possible;
88
 but in her 2010 study on jury 
trials Thomas found that many jurors were still unsure how to report such irregularities.
89
 
Thomas’ findings suggested that the ideal of a judge educating a jury about the relevant law 
needed to be reassessed, inasmuch as judges were failing to convey to jurors the essential 
points regarding the prevention of misbehaviour; and Thomas is currently working on a 
project aimed at improving the comprehensibility of judicial directions.
90
 But this project 
should not be taken to mean that judges must be reminded to educate their juries: the 
existence of Thomas’ project suggests this ideal still has much purchase, and that in the 
domain of the jury at least we still live in a world established towards the end of the 
eighteenth century.
91
 
Following several high-profile cases in which the judicial preference for guiding and 
educating jurors failed to prevent misconduct, the Attorney General asked the Law 
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Commission to expedite the jury-centric aspects of its review of the law of contempt.
92
 In 
December 2013, the Law Commission recommended the creation of a new indictable offence 
‘for a sworn juror in a case deliberately searching for extraneous information related to the 
case that he or she is trying’;93 and in February the following year the government introduced 
legislation to that effect. The Bill did not, however, reflect several other recommendations, 
such as having the Department for Education ‘encourage schools to deliver teaching about 
the role and importance of jury service’.94 The government’s response focused on shoring up 
juror punishment but, as Cheryl Thomas has noted, ‘if people believe that simply by making 
it a statutory offence that will eliminate any inappropriate use of the internet by jurors, they 
are mistaken.’95 While there was some attempt in the Public Bill Committee at revisiting the 
Law Commission’s recommendation regarding citizenship education,96 the preponderance of 
parliamentary comment on the new offences was positive, with critique going more to 
practical detail than to wider points of principle. 
One of the most striking features of the new offences is the subjection of criminal jurors 
suspected of misconduct to a jury trial. As we have already seen, the attaint never appears to 
have applied to criminal jurors, and it is unclear whether a criminal juror has ever been 
proceeded against for embracery. The Courts Act creates four new indictable offences, and 
the expectation is that unlike embracery jurors will be prosecuted for these crimes.
97
 
According to the Law Commission’s 2013 proposals, the senior judiciary supported the move 
from contempt to indictment;
98
 and the Law Commission itself has argued that proceeding 
against jurors through the Crown Court will emphasise just how seriously juror misconduct is 
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now being taken.
99
 It remains to be seen whether juror punishment will, as the judiciary 
declared a decade ago, still be considered a last resort. But indictable offences are under 
much less judicial control than proceedings for criminal contempt,
100
 and so it is unclear to 
what extent judicial feelings about misconduct will predict the relative frequency of 
punishment and of simple corrective guidance (such as a direction to disregard improperly 
obtained evidence). 
One of the central arguments put forward in the previous section was that the end of 
regularised juror punishment during the Restoration shifted the judge-jury relationship, with 
the judge’s role becoming more about educating a jury than about using the threat of 
punishment to avoid perceived misconduct. As the law previously stood (before the new 
Act), the judge had to explain the jury’s role at the start of each trial; and misconduct was 
framed in terms of this individualised definition of good conduct.
101
 Law Commissioner 
Professor David Ormerod QC, giving evidence to the Public Bill Committee, explained that 
this potentially 
‘destroyed the rapport that they were trying to build with the jury, whereas if the 
offences existed as normal criminal offences defined by Parliament, judges would be 
able to say, “This is not a matter for me. Parliament has decided that this should be 
criminal and it has already been explained to you.” So they would be relieved of that 
specific obligation.’ 102 
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But by regularising the threat of punishment in this way, the judge is relieved of part of her 
obligation to ensure the jurors understand their task. The judge takes a significant step away 
from her historic role of guiding the jury. 
On the other hand, it must be remembered that the judgment in Bushell’s Case was largely 
motivated by a perception that it was not appropriate to have judges punish jurors for 
whatever they considered to be misconduct. Vaughan CJ cast around for evidence of the 
attaint in criminal cases, and failed to find any; but it is inherent in the logic of Bushell’s 
Case that jurors are necessarily better placed than judges to assess alleged impropriety. This 
argument should not be underestimated: it may be that taking the process out of the hands of 
the judges, leaving any conviction in the hands of a second jury, brings with it not only the 
procedural protections of a trial on indictment, but also the added legitimacy of making 
questions about a jury questions for a jury.
103
 In this sense, the new offences in the Courts 
Act cannot fully be understood in the context of the criminal jury’s modern history, and 
should be read in light of the central distinction in Bushell’s Case between judge-centric 
contempt and jury-centric attaint. If this is the proper context of the reforms, commentators 
should consider exploring the attaint’s history in civil trials.104 
A second significant feature of the juror punishment provisions in the Courts Act is the 
partial disenfranchisement it entails for misbehaving jurors. As well as permanently 
disqualifying anyone who has ever been imprisoned for five years or more,
105
 the Juries Act 
also disqualifies for ten years anyone sentenced to imprisonment (including a suspended 
sentence of imprisonment),
106
 and anyone sentenced to a community order (including 
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community punishment and rehabilitation orders, drug treatment and testing orders, etc.).
107
 
As the law previously stood, juror misconduct was considered contempt, and so was 
punishable either by fine or by imprisonment.
108
 Not all jurors found guilty of misconduct 
would, therefore, be disqualified. The Courts Act, however, has amended the 1974 Act so as 
to exclude from jury service anyone convicted under the new offences within the last ten 
years.
109
 As well as the simple fact of criminalising such activities, the Courts Act also 
excludes those who carry them out from participating in what is widely regarded as an 
important part of an active citizen’s civic engagement. By coupling the punishment of jurors 
deemed (by other jurors) to have acted improperly with partial disenfranchisement, the new 
offences can be analogised to the excessive punishment of the attaint. 
I argued in the previous section that the move away from juror punishment and towards juror 
guidance was a necessary precondition of the idea of jury service as a civic schoolhouse; and 
that this approach to jury management could be contrasted to the interrelated images of a 
hostile judge punishing a jury and of a jury coming into court with the preconceived ideas of 
justice implicit in the concept of jury equity. In the first model, the juror’s training more 
completely integrates her into the political life of the community; in the second, judge and 
jury must necessarily come into conflict over the true nature of a contested common-law 
tradition. Ferguson has recently described jury service as a ‘constitutional teaching moment’; 
110
 and several other academics have demonstrated how, in the United States at least, the 
deliberative experience which comes with serving on a jury strongly correlates to an increase 
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in civic participation generally.
111
 It is not only by excluding misbehaving jurors from future 
service that the new offences potentially undermine the political value of the jury system. By 
moving towards a more antagonistic model, the new legislation downplays the importance of 
the judge in a past juror’s future political life. 
The Law Commission’s recommendations regarding jurors and the internet included a 
recommendation that schools should place greater emphasis on the nature of jury service.
112
 
But while the government was enthusiastic about juror punishment,
113
 the recommendation 
regarding citizenship education does not feature in the Act. When Law Commissioner David 
Ormerod QC was asked about ‘the education of jurors’,114 he confirmed he would like to see 
this point ‘taken forward, whether in the Bill or otherwise’.115 Cheryl Thomas’ answers on 
this point focused more on court-based measures designed to ‘achieve behavioural 
change’,116 rather than on any wider points about the national curriculum. Andy Slaughter 
MP proposed an amendment which would place a duty on the Ministry of Justice to ‘develop 
a public education programme on the role and responsibilities of jurors’;117 but he was 
persuaded to withdraw the amendment by ministerial assurances that it would be better to 
implement such any such scheme ‘administratively [rather] than through legislation’.118 It 
remains to be seen whether the Law Commission’s education-based proposals will actually 
be taken up by government; but as things stand the focus is squarely on educating jurors at 
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court, rather than on ‘encourag[ing] schools to deliver teaching about the role and importance 
of jury service’.119 
There is a tension in the new juror offences between an educational and a punitive approach, 
with continued judicial efforts aimed at guiding juries towards good behaviour sitting 
awkwardly with the government’s resistance to anything other than punishment. In some 
respects, these divergent approaches may be seen as two sides of the same coin: the judges 
will try to guarantee compliance, and if that fails the executive will initiate proceedings 
against individual jurors. The threat of a jury trial may help keep jurors in check, but any 
regularisation of punishment represents a significant departure from historic practice. This 
must, from one perspective, constitute success: a notorious problem, which in recent years 
has denied several defendants a fair trial, is being taken seriously in a clear, visible way. 
What is less visible is the potential this reform has to undermine the jury’s role as a civic 
institution. Seen from a wider perspective, one which takes the institution’s history seriously, 
the proposed offences risk undermining the jury’s potential to be, as the American political 
scientist Albert Dzur has recently put it, a ‘deliberation machine for critically attuning public 
reflections on law and order and ultimately for helping to create a justice system in which 
citizens can take pride’.120 
 
Conclusions 
Over the last ten years, the standard response to juror misconduct has shifted, from an 
educational paradigm to one which presents punishment as an unproblematic part of juror 
management. There is in this shift a move away from the old idea that serving on a jury can 
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be a formative experience, and that trial by jury is therefore a key way to maintain an active 
citizenry. This idea is being edged out by a close cousin of the older notion that juries are the 
place where an already-formed citizenry comes into court in order to judge the justice of the 
law. Because the trial is not a formative experience, judges can ultimately be absolved of 
their responsibility to ensure their juries fully understand their role. If the attempt at 
educating a juror fails, criminal sanctions are the most rational response. This change in 
emphasis suggests a change in the jury’s role as civic schoolroom; but this critique has not 
been made, and this aspect of the new offences has passed largely without comment. My 
argument is that this failure to see the significance of this change in emphasis is directly 
related to a general failure to see the jury historically. 
I have argued that history offers a way of opening up conceptual problems which are 
necessarily obscured by too close a focus on finding immediate solutions to immediate 
problems. Despite Thomas’ scepticism, it is possible that the threat of juror punishment will 
“eliminate any inappropriate use of the internet by jurors”. But whether it will actually do so 
is not the point of this article: rather the point has been to argue that ‘the merit of history lies 
in opening rather than in closing questions – in revealing options rather than insisting on 
answers.’121 And it may be that Darbyshire was correct to argue that insufficient theoretical 
attention has been paid to interrogating what one journalist has recently praised as ‘the most 
ancient form of democracy’.122 An interdisciplinary link between legal history and the 
mainstream of jury studies can help explore such issues by reframing the problem within 
historical ambiguity rather than legalistic certainty. 
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Ultimately, the use of legal history in contemporary debates about the future direction either 
of the criminal trial jury specifically, or of the legal system generally, cannot be prescriptive: 
it must be about a broadening of perspective, such that questions and problems which might 
otherwise go unnoticed can be brought into focus. As John Tosh has put it, 
‘[t]hinking historically – or “thinking with history” – means employing historical 
perspective to illuminate current issues. It means identifying what is distinctive about 
the present, enlarging our awareness of the possibilities inherent in the present, and 
situating the present in the temporal flows which link it with the past and the 
future.’123 
If the new offences in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act have passed largely without 
comment, this must in large part be because of a failure to think through history, to see the 
current crisis in jurors accessing improper materials as something not only flowing out of the 
exigencies of a period in time when information has generally become readily available, and 
people have become used to accessing it almost instantly. In order to properly understand this 
crisis, and the possible range of solutions, we must learn to see the jury historically. 
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